Residence Hall Security Review Committee
Final Report
February 2012
SUMMARY

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
• The MIT residence halls are designed to be distinctively welcoming, and to be a major resource serving the overall educational needs of the students.
• MIT has a responsibility to provide for the safety and well being of all members of each residential community.
• The autonomy and local authority of each residential community is a resource that must be engaged to ensure that each residence is as safe as possible.
• It is appropriate for a set of uniform performance standards to be in place across the residential system, even if those standards are achieved in different ways.
• MIT must be willing to regularly revisit tried-and-true ways of doing things, to ensure that issues of security are being handled in a way that is appropriate for the current circumstances.
• Changes to security practices, policies, and procedures should be done based on evidence that these changes are responsive to actual vulnerabilities.
• When MIT deviates from common practices, they have a responsibility to articulate why they do things differently.

GENERAL FINDINGS
• The residential system is generally secure, but there are important deficiencies that should be addressed in some residences, to bring security up to a standard that is expected of MIT.
• The most significant deficiencies that the committee encountered pertained to training and management, rather than physical arrangements or personnel.
• The diversity of building designs and student cultures make a one-size-fits-all approach to residential security impracticable.
• The most serious deficiency in past reports on residential security have been the failure to identify community support and buy-in as the most important factors in ensuring the security of the residences.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
• Each residence hall should be charged with developing a security plan that is tailored for that residence, assisted by professional security consultants engaged by MIT, for approval by the Dean for Student Life, by the beginning of the fall 2012 semester.
• The role of security should be elevated in the functioning of the residence hall desks.
• Some well-targeted physical improvements should be made to the residence halls to enhance safety, which might include:
  o All residence halls should have a staffed from desk; entrances should be altered to install a front desk in buildings that do not have them.
  o Some existing front desks should be altered to enhance their security function.
  o Monitoring cameras may be appropriate to cover entrances, depending on their suitability to particular buildings, so long as policies are developed to govern their appropriate use.
  o Secondary entrances should be evaluated for the installation of better alarm systems.
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SECTION 1: ABOUT THE RESIDENCE HALL SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE

1.1 INTRODUCTION
In December of 2011, the Dean for Student Life, Costantino Colombo, formed the Residence Hall Security Review Committee to examine the current policies and procedures related to the security of MIT’s residential community. This committee was also asked to provide recommendations for improving campus safety among the residences. The committee was asked to report back to the dean by the end of the IAP period, February 3, 2012. The committee met frequently, focusing on broad issues. In some cases, the committee’s members had to confine themselves to unearthing issues that will have to be considered by others in the future. Nonetheless, the committee was able to reach a number of firm conclusions and is happy to report on its findings.

1.2 CHARGE
The Residence Hall Security Review Committee was given a five-point charge:

1. Review the policies, procedures, and mechanisms related to the security of all undergraduate and graduate residence halls.

2. Examine operational structures in the residence halls including the electronic access system, the Nightwatch program, video monitoring and any other monitoring systems, and front desk staffing.

3. Develop a list of crucial, short-term, and long-term recommendations that will meet the developing needs of MIT’s dynamic residential environment.

4. Describe these recommendations and their fiscal implications in a report to be submitted to the Dean for Student Life no later than February 3, 2012.

5. Provide recommendations to the Dean for Student Life about engaging with the residential community about security

To make the task manageable in the time allotted for its work, the committee focused their attention on the physical security of the entrances into the residence halls, with a two-pronged goal: (1) to ensure that only authorized individuals (residents and guests) enter and (2) the entry of authorized residents and guests not interfere with the security of the entrances.

The committee did not address the following issues; however, these issues should be addressed in the future:

• Security within the residence halls. The major exception concerns the use of lockout keys.
• Security within the Fraternities, Sororities and Independent Living Groups (FSILGs).

To accomplish its assignment, the committee held seven meetings and reviewed written policies concerning front desk workers, desk captains, house managers and Nightwatch staff. The committee also met with the Director of Housing (twice), and with groups of Housemasters, House Managers, Nightwatch personnel, dormitory officers, graduate resident tutors, front desk workers, desk captains, and members of MIT police. Some members of the committee took a tour of four representative residence halls to get a first-hand glimpse of the campus residences. Finally, the committee updated the benchmarking against peer and neighboring universities that was last conducted in 2008.

The committee was asked to provide information that would help for the budgeting of its recommendations. Because of the short deadline, they were unable to provide a detailed accounting of the budgetary implications of this report. Items with significant budgetary implementations have been flagged with footnotes. The committee trusts that the DSL director of finance can estimate the costs associated with items in the report. The committee is also aware of the impending capital renewal plan, and urges the Institute to make residential security a priority for the use of those funds.

1.3 MEMBERSHIP
Yun-Xiang Chu, Graduate Resident Tutor (GRT)
John DiFava, Co-Chair – Director, Facilities Operations and Security
Mark DiVincenzo – Deputy General Counsel
Sharon Snaggs Gendron - Assistant Director, Student Outreach and Support
Henry Humphreys, Senior Associate Dean for Student Life
Tom Komola - Manager, Facilities Operations - SEMO
Ellen McIsaac, Undergraduate Student and President of DormCon
Dan O’Neill - Senior Vice President, TSG Solutions
Charles Stewart III, Co-Chair – Housemaster of McCormick Hall, and Professor of Political Science
Staff to the Committee: Alyssa May - Marketing & Communications Manager, Residential Life
SECTION 2: BACKGROUND

2.1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

To help set the parameters of the committee’s work, its members offer the following set of general principles to frame the analysis that follows:

• The MIT residence halls are designed to be distinctively welcoming, and to be a major resource serving the overall educational needs of the students.
• MIT has a responsibility to provide for the safety and well being of all members of each residential community.
• The autonomy and local authority of each residential community is a resource that must be engaged to ensure that each residence is as safe as possible.
• It is appropriate for a set of uniform performance standards to be in place across the residential system, even if those standards are achieved in different ways.
• MIT must be willing to regularly revisit tried-and-true ways of doing things, to ensure that issues of security are being handled in a way that is appropriate for the current circumstances.
• Changes to security practices, policies, and procedures should be done based on evidence that these changes are responsive to actual vulnerabilities.
• When MIT deviates from common practices, they have a responsibility to articulate why they do things differently.

Note that the first four general principles are somewhat in tension. For instance, many of MIT’s residence halls are, by design, porous, and students have been entrusted with managing the affairs of dormitories in ways that suit local tastes and culture. At the same time, MIT, not residential hall residents, is ultimately accountable for the quality of residential security. These tensions are inherent in MIT’s residential system. However, in the end, the committee members trust that the diversity of this system can be used to strengthen residential security. The committee also recognizes that achieving the appropriate level of security, as a consequence, will take more effort than at other universities of similar size.

The members of this committee also believe that these eight principles, together, helped to make their deliberations, and therefore recommendations, distinctly MIT.

2.2. RELEVANT DIMENSIONS OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY

That is the high level of abstraction. As a more operational level, the committee was impressed by the diversity of settings in which residential security must be considered. The following are some of the most salient dimensions on which MIT residences vary — dimensions which each present different challenges and opportunities in securing these residences:

• Graduate vs. undergraduate
• Single-entry vs. multi-entry
• Large vs. small
• Front desk vs. no front desk
• Core of campus vs. periphery
• Community cohesion high vs. community cohesion low
• Families vs. singles
• Dining vs. no dining

This diversity presents challenges that are usually not present at other universities, either those in the immediate area, or our peers nationwide—even peers that have similarly rich residential environments. This diversity is manageable, however.

2.3. BUILDING OFF OF THE 2008 CLAY REPORT ON RESIDENTIAL SECURITY
The committee was assisted by the work of the 2008 Task Force on Residential Security, which was chaired by Chancellor Philip Clay. After reading that report and reflecting on the more recent deliberations, the committee concluded that it is an excellent starting point for describing the current state of security in the residence halls, describing local and global conditions, and recommending actions to enhance the security of the residences. The committee used that report as a base to build on. Starting there, the members further articulated ways in which that report’s findings and recommendations might be strengthened, in light of the passage of time.

The committee spent its third two-hour meeting with the Director of Housing, reviewing his report of progress made toward implementing the recommendations contained in the 2008 Clay Report. While there are some exceptions, in general the recommendations in the report have been only partially implemented. It was explained to us that the failure to fully implement the report’s recommendations were due to the 2008 financial crisis. The changes to the residential system that have been made in the interest of security over the past four years have tended to be reactive and on the margin, rather than strategic. While we appreciate the deep financial crisis facing the Institute and the nation at the time, it is unfortunate that strategic momentum in addressing security issues in the dormitory was lost following the release of the Clay Report. In addition, some of the recommendations that were not implemented did not involve significant spending. Because low- (or no-) cost management changes were not pursued, we were left wondering about the priority placed on the security of the residences over the past four years.

Although the 2008 report does an excellent job in laying out the issues facing residential security, we believe that there were two factors that have changed at MIT in recent years, which have contributed to the challenges facing the security of our residence halls.

First, there is a greater “customer service” attitude among MIT students and families, compared to generations past. This attitude makes students less interested in subsidizing the provision of student services by working low-wage jobs, such as desk worker, in favor of higher-value jobs (UROP, etc.) or devoting time to studies. MIT’s modern residential system was built on an assumption that students would take responsibility for staffing vital functions like desk. This assumption no longer holds to the degree it once did.
Second, MIT installed electronic card readers at the entries of all the residence halls roughly fifteen years ago. Although these devices helped to increase the security of the residence halls in some regards, they have undermined security in others. Under the older system, in which entry into most residence halls required a desk worker to “buzz” everyone into the building, including residents, one could be assured that everyone entering the residence hall was at least scrutinized by staff. Now, with electronic access, desk workers can abandon the desk, and yet people can still enter.

Finally, the committee notes that the Clay Report emphasized physical changes to the residence halls and enhancement to desk staff as a means to achieving greater residential security. As important as these factors are, the committee feels that the report did not emphasize the most important factor leading to residential security — community involvement in achieving security.

### 2.4. GENERAL FINDINGS

With the 2008 report findings and recommendations in mind, the committee emphasized the following four points as its most important general findings:

- The residential system is generally secure, but there are important deficiencies that should be addressed in some residences, to bring security up to a standard that is expected of MIT.
- The most significant deficiencies that the committee encountered pertained to training and management, rather than physical arrangements or personnel.
- The diversity of building designs and student cultures make a one-size-fits-all approach to residential security impracticable.
- The most serious deficiency in past reports on residential security have been the failure to identify community support and buy-in as the most important factors in ensuring the security of the residences.

### 2.5. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Finally, the following four points constitute the committee’s general recommendations, which are articulated further in the next section:

- Each residence hall should be charged with developing a security plan that is tailored for that residence, assisted by professional security consultants engaged by MIT, for approval by the Dean for Student Life, by the beginning of the fall 2012 semester.
- The role of security should be elevated in the functioning of the residence hall desks.
- Some well-targeted physical improvements should be made to the residence halls to enhance safety, which might include:
  - All residence halls should have a staffed from desk; entrances should be altered to install a front desk in buildings that do not have them.
  - Some existing front desks should be altered to enhance their security function.
  - Monitoring cameras may be appropriate to cover entrances, depending on their suitability to particular buildings, so long as policies are developed to govern their appropriate use.
o Secondary entrances should be evaluated for the installation of better alarm systems.

• In developing security plans for each residence hall, the general approach should emphasize *minimal performance standards* rather than *uniform practices* in achieving security goals in dorms. Uniform practices are most appropriate when MIT has to rely on personnel who move between dorms to handle urgent matters (e.g., Nightwatch, Unit 12).
SECTION 3. RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, the committee articulates further the four general recommendations that have just been introduced. To a large degree, these specific recommendations build directly off of recommendations contained in the Clay Report. In those cases, the committee makes direct reference to the Clay Report discussion of these matters. However, as will become clear, this report goes beyond the Clay Report, in most instances.

3.1. RESIDENTIAL SECURITY PLANS
If residence halls are to be as secure as they can be, the residents must “own” the security of their residence halls; security must be a central part in each hall’s culture. Residential cultures and architecture vary considerably, which means that the specific ways in which residence halls respond to this challenge must vary. Therefore, the committee offers the following recommendations as a way to help make security more of a priority in each residence hall, while at the same time, enhancing security in meaningful ways.

RECOMMENDATION 1:
Each residence should be charged with developing a comprehensive security plan, which will be submitted to the Dean for Student Life for approval, as soon as practically possible.
This plan should be led jointly by the Housemaster and House Manager of each residence hall, and actively involve the associate director of housing operations, GRTs (in undergraduate residence halls) and student residents. The residence hall-wide effort should be managed by the new associate director for housing facilities, to help ensure completeness of the plans. To facilitate planning, MIT should engage a professional who has experience in campus security and who is eager to work within the diversity of the MIT residential system.¹ Each plan should address the following points:

- Physical security
- Policies and procedures
- Electronic security systems
- Redundancy of Systems
- Human deployment

These plans should be developed expeditiously. It would be ideal for the plans to be in place by the beginning of the 2012 school year. The committee recognizes that engaging a consultant and initiating these planning processes will take a lot of time; it is unreasonable to expect for full progress to be made during the spring 2012 semester. Since community involvement is so important in ensuring the success of these plans, the committee hesitated to recommend that these plans be completed over the summer, with their implementation in September. For that reason, the members recognize that the practical deadline for this recommendation may be sometime in the fall term 2012. However, this recommendation about timing should not be interpreted as a suggestion that this activity be delayed, beyond

¹ Budgetary item.

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what is necessary to organize the necessary resources and engage the residences in a meaningful process about security in each residence.

To support the implementation of comprehensive residential security plans, the committee also recommends a series of practices that can be implemented immediately, some of which were recommended in the 2008 Clay Report.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:**
Security meetings should be held between the Housemaster, House Manager, Desk Captain and dormitory president of each residence hall, on a monthly basis.
Once the security plans are in place, regular meetings among the leadership of each residence can help to ensure that the plans are being implemented effectively. Even before the plans are employed, the committee believes that it would be beneficial for the Housemaster, House Manager, Desk Captain, and Dormitory President to hold a monthly meeting, at which time issues pertaining to residential security are discussed. The Director of Housing should ensure that these meetings are taking place, and help facilitate them if scheduling difficulties arise.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:**
Housemasters should be asked to comment on security in the annual report to the Dean for Student Life.
This would allow the Dean for Student Life to hear from the houses, at least once a year, about the security issues facing each residence hall.

**RECOMMENDATION 4:**
Graduate Resident Tutors (GRTs) should have security awareness training during their annual fall GRT training session. GRTs should use this training to help educate their students about security in individual residence halls.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see pp. 11 and 16 in the Clay Report). We learned that as a consequence of the recommendation in the Clay Report, GRT training now includes a security session with Sgt. Cheryl Vossmer and Capt. Dave Carlson from MIT Police. The committee believes that this training is a good start, but is concerned about the degree to which it has infiltrated into the programming in the residence halls. Therefore, as a next step, future GRT training should be aimed at helping to facilitate the implementation of the security plans for each residence.

**RECOMMENDATION 5:**
Housemasters should have daily briefings with Nightwatch staff at end of their shift.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). Four years ago, the Clay Report noted that communication between Nightwatch and Housemasters was inadequate. The committee learned that the quality of communication remains uneven across the residences. The Director of Housing should review this recommendation with each housemaster, to ensure that in every case, some workable system has been established for communication.
In addition, in the 2008 Clay Report, the overnight e-mail report from Unit-12 to housing management and housemasters was cited as being inadequate. Furthermore, there was no analogous reporting that occurs for period when Nightwatch is not on duty. No change has been made since 2008 to remedy either deficiency. Unfortunately, continuing the status quo was cited to the committee as evidence that this recommendation had been addressed.

**RECOMMENDATION 6:**
**Residence halls with guest list policies should review those policies, in light of how they currently function in the residences, and in light of Institute and Cambridge City regulations.**
It was suggested to the committee by some that residence halls should not use guest lists, and that residents must escort all non-residents into and around the residence halls. The committee does not agree with this blanket recommendation. However, its members learned that guest list implementation has become lax in some residence halls. Residents do not appear to be aware that they are responsible for the behavior of those who are on their guest list — even if the resident is not in the building. Some desk workers tend not to check visitors against guest lists, and take the word of the visitor that they are on the list. In light of these concerns, the house governments, with the participation of the Housemasters and House Managers, should review guest list policies and practices. If a residence hall wishes to eliminate guest lists, that should be their prerogative.

**RECOMMENDATION 7:**
**The Housing Office should review policies and procedures for the residential system that pertains to visitors, in light of Institute and Cambridge City regulations.**
It became clear to the committee that Institute policies pertaining to all residents are not clearly communicated to residents, and that some policies that carry out the requirements of Cambridge City regulations may not be communicated at all. Of most relevance to the committee, the requirement that overnight guests register at the front desk — which is understood to be a City requirement — no longer appears in residential policies and procedures made available to students. In light of this fact, the Director of Housing should ensure that all relevant governmental regulations pertaining to building visitors be included in the residential rules and regulations. In addition, any requirements that have inadvertently been removed, such as the requirement for the registration of overnight guests, must be clearly communicated to residents.

**RECOMMENDATION 8:**
**The Housing Office should distribute a written list of residential policies and procedures to each resident, each year.**
It is also clear that a more active program of informing residents of the policies and procedures related to safety and security needs to be implemented. A basic component of such a program is the annual distribution to all residents of a document that lists regulations that pertain to the residences. The current websites that communicate these policies are cumbersome and difficult to access. Even though a website with residential policies and procedures is an indispensable supplement for the communication of community expectations and requirements, it is no substitute for a physical document handed to each resident each year.
3.2. ELEVATE THE ROLE OF SECURITY FOR THE RESIDENCE HALL DESKS

The front desks function as the most critical point in the residence halls in ensuring that only authorized individuals enter the building. In practice, the front desks tend to serve two functions, as a service desk and as a security desk. To ensure the greatest degree of security in the residence halls, the service functions must take a secondary role to the security functions. That is not always the case at present. The committee, therefore, offers the following recommendations, with the goal of enhancing the role that the front desks play in ensuring residential security.

RECOMMENDATION 9:
Professional staff should be employed to assist in reviewing job descriptions for the front desk and desk captain positions.

(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). The committee reviewed the job descriptions of the desk captains and desk workers. It is clear that the job descriptions can be updated, especially as they pertain to security, which should be emphasized in each. The associate director for housing operations should lead an effort to review with the House Managers the job descriptions of the front desk staff and desk captains. In conducting this review, the associate director of housing operations should involve people with expertise in human resources and security, to ensure that job descriptions are complete, and the training is aligned with those descriptions. The desk captain and desk worker positions require a high level of commitment and accountability, which should be reflected in their job descriptions and training.

One issue the committee encountered was the practice of desk workers only committing to work a very limited number of hours each week, sometimes as little as one or two hours. Such short hours make it difficult to reinforce good practices. It also means that an inordinate amount of time must be spent training a large number of desk workers. Therefore, we consider it important that desk workers be expected to commit to a minimum of eight hours per week working at desk, more if possible.

In addition, the title and job description of the desk captain position should be changed to focus more on security, as if he or she was the “security czar” of the residence hall, and not only of the front desk staff.

The committee also found that the job of desk worker really encompasses duties that correspond with two roles, (1) service and (2) security. It is clear that, at least during some times of each day, one person cannot perform both sets of duties simultaneously. The committee believes that this reality must be addressed in three ways. First, the desk worker job description should, to the degree practicable, clearly delineate a set of expectations related to security and a separate set of expectations related to service. If these two sets of expectations are combined into one job description, it must be clear that the security role takes priority over providing desk services. Second, the residential system should seriously consider whether two separate desk worker positions should be
created, one that handles the security functions of the desk, while the other handles the service functions. Third, regardless of whether it is eventually deemed best to create two separate job descriptions, or retain one job description for desk workers, the residences should assign more than one desk worker to front desks during the periods of the day with the highest entering traffic, which is generally the 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. period.

The committee does not want to be too prescriptive on how this recommendation is implemented. In reviewing how the security role should be maintained, the residence halls, working with the associate director of housing operations, should be creative in envisioning new models for the security function at the front desks.

RECOMMENDATION 10: Institute-wide security training should be introduced for all desk staff.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). The committee reviewed the training of desk workers and desk captains. Training of desk workers is currently decentralized, conducted by a combination of the house manager and the desk captain. Desk captain training is similarly decentralized. Efforts have been made by the house managers in recent years to provide a centralized training program for desk captains. However, that program currently has two major problems. First, the training protocol we reviewed did not focus on the particular challenges of the desk captain position, which pertained to training students how to manage and encourage their peers to take their jobs seriously. Rather, the content was focused on material that desk workers should already be familiar with. Second, we learned from talking to desk captains that training has not occurred face-to-face, due to scheduling problems. Rather, the centralized desk captain training amounts to the emailing of a PowerPoint deck to the desk captains.

The Director of Housing should direct a process in which the House Managers work with HR and other professionals to create more detailed, standardized training protocols to motivate as much as inform the front desk workers and desk captains. This needs to be an on-going training program, starting with new employee training and continuing with semester training refreshers, as well as monthly trainings on specific topics.

The current GRT training program might serve as a model for how such training could occur. The reason the GRT training program could serve as a model is that GRTs also are situated in a dual role, being responsible both for a set of common Institute expectations while working in a series of local settings with their own arrays of challenges, expectations, and accountability structures. Although the GRTs all operate in distinct dormitory/floor cultures, the current program of common GRT training nonetheless equips the GRTs with a set of skills that are invaluable regardless of their residence hall assignment. Centralizing training facilitates the involvement of a variety of on-campus professionals who can help inform and motivate the GRTs. Throughout the year, a series of in-service training opportunities help enhance the common training that occurs during the summer. During the school year, GRTs mostly interact with their local community, including taking direction for the Housemasters, who directly supervise them. Nonetheless, the foundation of the GRT’s work in a diversity of environments nonetheless rests on the common training that is organized by the dean’s office. In a similar way, training of desk staff should move to
a model that rests on a common core, delivered centrally, with local conditions taken into account by desk staff working with the House Manager.

RECOMMENDATION 11:
Photo ID’s of residence hall residents should be available to front desk staff for identification purposes.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). This was an important recommendation of the Clay Report, which has not been executed. The committee understands the failure to implement this recommendation to be a combination of institutional inertia and the overly zealous application of privacy concerns that go beyond what is required of MIT policy. The committee feels very strongly that this recommendation can and should be implemented immediately.

The committee also recommends that the Institute go a step further. The Institute should consider the deployment at each front desk a system that displays on a screen viewable by the desk worker the picture on the ID card that is used for entry. Such systems are already deployed in area universities, such as at the entrance to Widener Library at Harvard. Desk workers and Nightwatch personnel currently have no way of knowing if an ID card being used for entry belongs to a resident of the building. Furthermore, a system such as this could be integrated with sign-in logs, to make the sign-in requirement for all visitors both more convenient and more secure for MIT community members.

RECOMMENDATION 12:
Key policies should be improved, including implementing a robust policy aimed at the prompt return of spare keys and regular checks of key inventory.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). There are lockout policies currently in place; however, the committee learned that the policies vary from residence hall to residence hall. In addition, inventory control of keys appears to be lax in some buildings. Lock cores are not routinely replaced whenever a student fails to return a key. Therefore, the new associate director for housing operations should work (1) to develop a unified policy pertaining to the distribution and control of keys, and (2) to develop procedures to better log the distribution of keys in the residences, paying particular attention to procedures that follow the loss or non-return of a key.

RECOMMENDATION 13:
The pay of front desk staff should be increased, to make the position more attractive to students.²
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). The Clay Report concluded that one of the main reasons why it was so difficult to recruit students to work at front desks is that the pay for front desk work is not competitive with other campus jobs, especially UROPs. The committee therefore recommended that desk worker pay be increased. Not only was this recommendation not implemented, but also the committee was shown a document that was created in July of 2009 that highlighted some of the updates that had been made to the 2008 recommendations. Regarding the increase in pay

² Budgetary item
for the front desk staff, the 2009 document stated that the pay was $9 to $13 per hour, which is essentially what it was back in 2008. The current committee was confused as to why this was seen as an increase, when the pay rate hadn’t changed. The committee is making a series of recommendations that will further increase the responsibility of desk workers. It is therefore even more critical that the pay of desk workers be increased, not only to overcome the current competitive deficiency, but also to recognize the increase in responsibilities.

Related to this recommendation, it has been suggested by some to the committee that students should no longer be employed at the front desks. We disagree with this as a blanket policy, although we also recognize that if the hours and performance expectations are raised, students may no longer wish to hold desk positions. However, we would emphasize two things. First, we believe the most important thing is the performance of the job, not who is performing it. Not every MIT student can perform well as a desk worker, but many can. Second, we heard many examples of how student desk workers provide better security service than non-students, by virtue of students’ knowledge of the buildings and the residences’ occupants. In any event, a campus that has student EMTs is certainly one that can consider having students staff the front desks.

During the course of its work, the committee heard a lot of comments concerning the use of temporary employees who covered the desks during the intersession break and IAP, from a wide variety of community members. Our conclusion is that overall; this was not a highly successful experiment. However, the experiment clarified for the committee the fact that the main deficiencies at the front desks are not the personnel who staff them, but the training and supervision of desk workers. In the short term, the residential system should focus on improving training and supervision of the front desks. If it is deemed prudent in the future to rely more heavily on non-MIT personnel to staff the front desks, a system will then be in place to better integrate them into the fabric of the residences.

RECOMMENDATION 14:
A pool of desk staff should be developed to fill gaps and temporary vacancies in the residence halls.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). Even if students remain the default personnel staffing the desks, there are times when scheduling students is especially challenging, such as during examination and intersession periods. The committee feels that an assembled group of workers who are already familiar with the different residence halls would be beneficial to have for staffing emergencies and/or gaps. Making arrangements for non-student desk staff is currently handled on a house-by-house basis. The Director of Housing should investigate whether the hiring of non-student personnel for front desks should be centralized.

RECOMMENDATION 15:
Up-to-date resident lists should be provided to the front desk staff and Nightwatch.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). There are many reasons why having a comprehensive and accurate paper list of dormitory residents is indispensable for the work of front desk staff and Nightwatch personnel. However, the
committee heard from both students and Unit-12 managers that the lists currently at the front desks are often inaccurate, or even non-existent. The Director of Housing should work with the House Managers to ensure that an accurate list of all residence hall residents is at the front desk, and that any changes to student room assignments be reflected on these lists without any delay. Outside auditing may be necessary to ensure that the resident lists are current.

RECOMMENDATION 16:
Better protocols should be developed to ensure that security procedures are being implemented at all residence halls, 24 hours a day.
There is currently no direct oversight of desk operations during the 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. shift. There is the need for a “night manager” to make regular rounds among the dormitories, to assist in the implementation of security procedures in all the dormitories during the early evening hours.

The committee also believes the front desks of the residence halls should be covered 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, including when Nightwatch is performing their rounds. This will require the development of protocols, and probably the hiring of new staff, to ensure that front desks are covered during the hours when Nightwatch is performing their rounds.

The committee finally recommends that the Nightwatch staff start their shift at 7:00 p.m., instead of midnight. This overlap would allow for front desk workers to report to the Nightwatch staff about any incidents or issues, before ending their shift.

RECOMMENDATION 17:
Software should be deployed to enhance the security functioning of the front desks.
There are many ways that MIT can use information technology to enhance security in the residence halls. The committee was informed that there already exist commercial off-the-shelf software systems that could be used to enhance security functions at the desk. Some of the security features that could readily be implemented at the front desks might include (1) displaying the resident’s photo when they tap their ID at the front desk, (2) integrating ID taps with the guest list software and (3) logging lockout key usage. The security reviews of the residences called for in Recommendation 1 will undoubtedly uncover other security functions that could be enhanced using commercially available software. In a few cases, commercial software will need to be adapted to integrate with MIT’s information technology systems. The dean’s office should support such efforts financially.

RECOMMENDATION 18:
Desk procedures in all residence halls should be reviewed annually.
The committee is unaware of a systematic program of reviewing the desk procedures of all the residence halls, to ensure that they remain in compliance with Institute and City

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regulations, and that they remain functional within the residence. The Director of Housing, along with the associate director of housing operations, should be charged with developing a rigorous system to review the security policies and procedures for all residence halls.

**RECOMMENDATION 19:**
A more robust set of logs for desk workers and Nightwatch staff is needed to track events in the residence halls during their shifts.
The committee heard reports that desk workers and Nightwatch employees are sometimes lax in recording notable events in their logs, and then communicating those events to house managers, housemasters, and Unit 12. The associate director of housing operations should manage a review of the various logging procedure, with the goal of increased communication about notable events in all buildings.

**3.3. PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS**
Although the primary focus should be on enhancing our human resources devoted to the security of the residence halls, a few targeted physical changes to some of the residence halls would help to facilitate the work of those responsible for residential security.

**RECOMMENDATION 20:**
In residence halls where a direct line of sight from the desk to the front door is not currently available, the desk area should be redesigned to improve sightlines.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). It is imperative that front desk workers are able to see the front entrance from their desks, and have “verbal control” over the front entrance, to ensure the safety of the residence halls and their residents. Although this is true of most buildings, it is not true of all. In addition, it may be appropriate for the entrances of some residence halls to be outfitted with turnstiles or other barriers to help control the flow of people into the building. Because of the diversity of main entrances, the design and construction/renovation of new front desks will probably have to develop over a few years. As a first step, the Director of Housing should be a comprehensive review of all front desks, with the goal of prioritizing the renovation of desks to achieve this recommendation.

**RECOMMENDATION 21:**
Procedures must be developed and implemented for card access systems for all residence halls that will facilitate the deactivation of card access to all entries of the residence hall.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 16 in the Clay Report). The current system of card deactivation is neither effective nor efficient. Most importantly, it is not currently possible for House Managers to perform a batch operation to deactivate a large number of access cards after they are no longer valid. Because deactivating cards is so onerous and time consuming — one house manager reported that it took him three days to deactivate all of the invalid cards — it rarely happens in some residences. As a consequence, it is possible that hundreds of individuals continue to have card access to residence halls they no longer live in. A better manual system of card deactivation must be implemented immediately; to ensure that residence halls are accessible with current resident ID’s only. The committee understands that MIT Housing is in the process of examining CBORD, a new comprehensive housing management system, which should help
to resolve this issue. However, MIT cannot wait on the deployment of this system to revamp the current manual systems.

**RECOMMENDATION 22:**  
**All residence halls, including those that do not have them, should be equipped with a staffed front desk.**

The presence of a person at the front desk of a residence hall is extremely valuable and sends an important message to students about their safety and protection. There are currently two residence halls with no front desk coverage at all. Because two of these residences are apartment buildings with children in the residence, not having someone on site who is responsible for security is very unwise in these locations.

**RECOMMENDATION 23:**  
**The entrances in some of the larger buildings should be consolidated during the night shift.**

A few of the larger residence halls have multiple entrances. Although these entrances present no undue security concerns during the day, at night they present a high risk for unauthorized entrance. Therefore, it is recommended that the Director of Housing review all the residence halls with multiple entrances, with a view toward closing those entrances during the 12 midnight-to-7 a.m. period.

**RECOMMENDATION 24:**  
**All exit doors should be alarmed with a 30-second delay that is wired back to the building’s front desk, to be monitored by the front desk worker or Nightwatch staff.**

(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 16 in the Clay Report). This recommendation was originally made in the Clay Report. Due to fire concerns, this exact recommendation may not be feasible. However, wiring all door alarms to sound at the front desk is feasible and should be implemented as soon as possible, to ensure that all suspicious uses of exits be attended to.

**RECOMMENDATION 25:**  
**A program to deploy security cameras at the entrances of the residence halls should be developed.**

(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 16 in the Clay Report). The deployment of a security camera system is one of the most sensitive issues the committee considered in its deliberations. On the one hand, the simple presence of security cameras can serve as a visual deterrent to crime. Cameras can provide vital evidence in the event of an unauthorized entry or criminal act. Numerous students, staff, and housemasters have voiced strong support for the increased use of surveillance cameras outside of the residences, to monitor entrances. On the other hand, opposition to surveillance, as a matter of personal freedom, runs high on the MIT campus. Students, staff and some Housemasters have also expressed this opposition.

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The committee is convinced that there is a middle ground in the use of security cameras. Cameras can be very useful in certain circumstances. At the same time, there are limits to how much information can be gleaned from monitoring security cameras. They are no panacea.

Cameras can be especially useful in two cases. First, Nightwatch staff who are responsible for the larger, multi-entrance dormitories often feel that they are outmatched in ensuring that secondary entrances are not used for unauthorized entry during the night shift. Newer camera technologies would be very useful in helping Nightwatch do their job. Second, cameras can be very helpful in the investigation of suspected crimes.

Two steps could be taken now to begin a program of installing cameras at dormitory entrances. First, an assessment can be made about the most useful deployment of cameras at each of the residences. The Director of Housing should begin this assessment.

Second, a process can be started to develop guidelines about the use of images that would be gathered by these cameras. The committee is of a mind that camera images should only be used to investigate possible criminal activity and unauthorized entrance of buildings. They should not be used to pursue disciplinary actions against members of the MIT community. The Dean for Student Life should appoint a committee of students, faculty, staff, and security experts to draft a policy about the use of these camera images.

RECOMMENDATION 26:
The Director of Housing should ensure that the campus video surveillance guidelines, as directed by the Security and Emergency Management Office, be met.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 16 in the Clay Report). The committee did not undertake a detailed examination of the implementation of this recommendation. The Director of Housing should nonetheless be charged with ensuring that this recommendation has been met.

RECOMMENDATION 27:
Security-related items should be included in annual room inspections.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 16 in the Clay Report). The current inspection program involves checking window stoppers to ensure they are present and properly installed and that grates and/or stoppers are installed on windows that can be accessed from ground level. The committee recommends that these inspections continue.

RECOMMENDATION 28:
Software to help manage the guest-list policy of the dormitories that have them should be developed centrally and deployed in all these dormitories.
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 13 in the Clay Report). The dormitories that currently have guest lists rely on a diversity of paper systems, which are both insecure and unreliable. Some residences that have used software to manage these lists have suffered catastrophic failures, as the computers on which they are written crashed, or the students who wrote specialized software left the Institute (or tried to commercialize the
software). Paper systems cannot be easily updated and managed in those few emergency cases where a single individual must be removed from multiple guest lists. The Director of Housing should arrange for the implementation of software, preferably based on a commercial off-the-shelf system, which could be deployed in all residences that currently use guest lists.

3.4 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
While the committee understands that the residential system at MIT is varied, some degree of uniformity is necessary for security to be most effectively provided in the residence halls. As mentioned before, MIT as an institution, and not the individual residences, is held accountable for the safety of MIT students living in the residence halls. It is costly, in terms of time and energy, when the employees of the Institute who are operationally responsible for the security of residents, must master as many security plans as there are residences. Speaking more prosaically, the residential security system depends on the functioning of employees, especially Unit-12 and Nightwatch, who must be able to take actions related to security in every building. When the policies and procedures they interact with are not uniform across dormitories — or are implemented in a wide variety of ways — the security of residents can be diminished.

Rather than list a series of recommendations in this section, the committee notes the items in which commonality across all residences is of paramount importance:

1. The security plans mentioned in Recommendation 1 should be assessed against the ability of the plan to deter unauthorized entry, and the ability to keep the entrance of authorized visitors free of confusion. All desks should be subject to regular audits and observation.
2. The protocols concerning the use of lockout keys mentioned in Recommendation 12 should be uniform across all residences.
3. The safety-related document mentioned in Recommendation 8 should contain a core of material that is common across all dormitories — including a list of Institute safety and security regulations — that could be augmented with information particular to individual residences.
4. The use of security cameras anticipated in Recommendation 25 should follow a set of policies and practices that are common to all residence halls.

3.5 OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Finally, the committee addresses a series of miscellaneous proposals related to security that do not fit into the larger themes articulated at the beginning of the report.

RECOMMENDATION 29:
The Nightwatch program should be extended to all residence halls.\(^{10}\)
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 11 in the Clay Report). The residence halls that currently do not have a Nightwatch program are Eastgate, Westgate and Tang Hall, which are all graduate residence halls. Random Hall is only partially covered. The

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committee cannot discern a reason why the residences currently without Nightwatch coverage are not covered.

RECOMMENDATION 30:  
**Security training for Nightwatch staff should be provided, annually.**  
(For a discussion of this recommendation, see p. 18 in the Clay Report). The committee was particularly impressed with the dedication of the Nightwatch staff, including the dedication they show to the residences they patrol, and to the seriousness afforded training by the management of the program. The committee recommends that MIT continue with the current Nightwatch training program. However, the details of the training program should be reviewed and updated annually.

RECOMMENDATION 31:  
**Communications between Nightwatch and MIT Police should be regularized.**  
Although Nightwatch and MIT Police personnel are on good working relations, there is no regular system of communication between these two units. The committee recommends that the management of both units develop a series of regular meetings and other opportunities for staff of each to share information and work together more closely.

RECOMMENDATION 32:  
**The Senior Associate Dean for Student Life should lead an outreach program to each residence hall during the spring term 2012, to communicate the findings of this report, and to begin a campus-wide discussion about how the security of each residence can be enhanced.**

The successful implementation of the recommendations outlined in this report requires the active participation of all segments of MIT’s residential communities. Because of the importance and complexity of the task, it is appropriate for a senior administrator within the Dean for Student Life staff take the lead in reaching out to all communities, and ensuring that all residences take the attention to security seriously.

The committee recommends that the Senior Associate Dean for Student Life develop a presentation that summarizes the findings of this report, to be shared, first, with the leadership of the residences, and next with the residents themselves. The leadership consists of the presidents of the residences (graduate and undergraduate), the Housemasters, and the House Managers. After this initial set of presentations, he should schedule a series of meetings with each of the residences to discuss residential security, both in the general terms outlined in this report, and as this report affects each residence distinctly. With nearly [twenty] residences, these meetings may take the entire semester to complete. Therefore, they should be held in parallel with the process that leads to the development of a security plan in each dormitory.

The Dean for Student Life should also charge the housemasters with engaging each of their communities in a discussion about enhancing the security of their building. These are conversations that do not have to wait for the Senior Associate Dean to visit each house. Indeed, if the houses are already engaged in an internal discussion about security, interacting with the Senior Associate Dean will be more productive.
With the submission of this report, the work of this committee is finished, and it considers itself disbanded. However, its members stand ready to assist the dean’s office in preparing for these meetings, and in helping to interpret the report to the community.

**RECOMMENDATION 33:**
The Dean for Student Life should reconvene this committee, for a very limited set of meetings, several months hence, to receive reports about how the recommendations contained in this report have progressed.

The committee notes that a very similar group was convened four years ago, wrote a report, and then disbanded, following which very little was done to implement the report’s recommendations. This cannot happen again. Due to the expertise that the committee has acquired in conducting its study, its members believe that it could provide helpful feedback to the dean about progress in addressing the previous recommendations.

As part of its fact-finding, the committee held meetings with numerous groupings of students, housemasters, and staff to discuss security in the residence halls. The committee feels that once a plan has been developed to implement the recommendations contained in this report that it would be beneficial to reconvene some of these groups, to discuss the committee’s findings, and to keep the conversation going about residential security.

Indeed, such discussions should be held on a regular basis, even when there is not a review of residential security being conducted.
SECTION 4: BENCHMARK INSTITUTIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL SECURITY

4.1 INSTITUTIONS
To assess MIT’s current level of provided security as compared with peer academic institutions, schools were selected from among Consortium on Financing Higher Education (COFHE) institutions; as well as selected schools within the Boston area. These eleven schools include: Boston College, Boston University, Brandeis University, Brown University, Columbia University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Northeastern University, Tufts University, University of Pennsylvania and Yale University.

4.2 CRITERIA
The institutions listed above were compared based on the following criteria:

- Recent changes to security policy
- Post incident security measures
- Normal residence access
- Lockout policy
- Spare key policy
- Guest policy
- Security measures

4.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Nearly all institutions have written policies that forbid the issue and/or borrowing of keys (spare or otherwise) to guests/visitors.
2. Boston University, Columbia, Johns Hopkins and University of Pennsylvania have security guards posted at entrances 24/7. Boston College, Brandeis, Brown, Harvard, Tufts and Yale do not have security guards posted per residence hall, but in some cases, guards conduct area security rounds. They do not, however, monitor access to entrances.
3. Most institutions issue spare keys for lockouts only and place time limits on how long the spare key can be checked out.
4. Some institutions require multiple forms of positive identification for lockout procedures.

4.4 APPENDIX OF BENCHMARK INSTITUTIONS
See the attached Appendix for detailed information about the academic institutions that were benchmarked by the committee.
SECTION 5: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY PLANS
1. Each residence hall be charged with developing a comprehensive security plan and submit it to the Dean for Student Life for approval, as soon as practically possible.

2. Security meetings should be held between the Housemaster, House Manager, Desk Captain and dormitory president of each residence hall, on a monthly basis.

3. Housemasters should be asked to comment on security in the annual report to the Dean for Student Life.

4. Graduate Resident Tutors (GRTs) should have security awareness training during their annual fall GRT training session. GRTs should use this training to help educate their students about security in individual residence halls.

5. Housemasters should have daily briefings with Nightwatch staff at end of their shift.

6. Residence halls with guest list policies should review those policies, in light of how they currently function in the residences, and in light of Institute and Cambridge City regulations.

7. The Housing Office should review policies and procedures for the residential system that pertains to visitors, in light of Institute and Cambridge City regulations.

8. The Housing Office should distribute a written list of residential policies and procedures to each resident, each year.

ELEVATE THE ROLE OF SECURITY FOR THE RESIDENCE HALL DESKS
9. Professional staff should be employed to assist in reviewing job descriptions for the front desk and desk captain positions.

10. Institute-wide security training should be introduced to all desk staff.

11. Photo ID’s of residence hall residents should be made available to front desk staff for identification purposes.

12. Key policies should be improved, including implementing a robust policy aimed at the prompt return of spare keys and regular checks on key inventory.

13. The pay of front desk staff should be increased to make the position more attractive to students.
14. A pool of desk staff should be developed to fill gaps and temporary vacancies in the residence halls.

15. Up-to-date resident lists should be provided to the front desk staff and Nightwatch.

16. Better protocols should be developed to ensure that security procedures are being implemented at all residence halls, 24 hours a day.

17. Software should be deployed to enhance the security functioning of the front desks.

18. Desk procedures in all residence halls should be reviewed annually.

19. A more robust set of logs for desk workers and Nightwatch staff is needed to track events in the residence halls during their shifts.

**PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS**

20. In residence halls where a direct line of sight from the desk to the front door is not currently available, consider redesign efforts to improve sightlines.

21. Develop and implement card access systems for all residence halls, which will allow for the deactivation of card access to all entries of the residence hall.

22. All residence halls, including those that do not currently have them, should be equipped with a staffed front desk.

23. The entrances in some of the larger buildings should be consolidated during the night shift.

24. All exit doors be alarmed with a 30-second delay that is wired back to the building’s front desk – to be monitored by the front desk worker or Nightwatch staff.

25. A program to deploy security cameras at the entrances of residence halls should be developed.

26. The Director of Housing should ensure that the campus video surveillance guidelines, as directed by the Security and Emergency Management Office, be met.

27. Security-related items should be included in annual room inspections.

28. Software to help manage the guest-list policy of the dormitories that have them should be developed centrally and deployed in all these dormitories.

**OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS**

29. The Nightwatch program should be extended to all residence halls.
30. Security training for Nightwatch staff should be provided annually.

31. Communications between Nightwatch and MIT Police should be regularized.

32. The Senior Associate Dean for Student Life should lead an outreach program to each residence hall during the spring term 2012, to communicate the findings of this report, and to begin a campus-wide discussion about how the security of each residence can be enhanced.

33. The Dean for Student Life should reconvene this committee, for a very limited set of meetings, several months hence, to receive reports about how the recommendations contained in this report have progressed.